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THE STARS ALIGNED:  THE LEGALITY, 
LEGITIMACY, AND LEGACY OF 2011’S 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN LIBYA 
Rachel E. VanLandingham* 
Certainly it is undoubted that ever since civil societies were 
formed, the rulers of each claimed some especial right over his 
own subjects. . . . [But] [i]f a tyrant . . . practises [sic] 
atrocities towards his subjects, which no just man can 
approve, the right of human social conne[ct]ion is not cut off 
in such a case.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION:  LIBYAN INTERVENTION REINFORCES UNITED NATIONS 
PARADIGM AND RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT DOCTRINE 
The United Nations Security Council’s passage of the United Nations 
Security Council Resolution (“UNSCR”) 1973 in March 2011, authorizing 
military force in Libya on humanitarian grounds, strengthened the 
United Nations Security Council’s role as the legal and legitimate 
authorizer of the use of force for such protective purposes.2  It will likely 
                                                 
* Judge Advocate, United States Air Force.  Presently assigned as a deputy department 
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Management) 1994, University of Maryland; B.S. (Political Science), 1992, United States Air 
Force Academy.  Member of the Bars of Texas, U.S.A.F. Court of Criminal Appeals, Court 
of Appeals for the Armed Forces, and the Supreme Court of the United States.  The views 
expressed herein are those of the individual Author only, and do not purport to express the 
views of the Department of the Air Force or any other department or agency of the United 
States government.  I would like to thank Nicole Cudiamat and Melissa Croom for their 
valuable research assistance on earlier drafts of this Essay. 
1 WILLIAM WHEWELL, HUGONIS GROTII DE JURE BELLI ET PACIS LIBRI TRES 439–40 
(translating the words of Hugo Grotius).  Grotius believed that states have a discretionary 
right to intervene, by force if necessary, in another state to prevent grave human suffering 
but do not have an obligation to do so.  Id.  This Essay argues that the current trend among 
nations is moving toward acceptance of an actual obligation to do so.  See J.L. Holzgrefe, 
The Humanitarian Intervention Debate, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION:  ETHICAL, LEGAL, 
AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 15, 26-27 (J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert O. Keohane, eds., 2003) 
(articulating a tenet of natural law theory that views humanitarian intervention as a 
discretionary right versus moral obligation). 
2 S.C. Res. 1973, ¶¶ 4, 6–8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011) (authorizing the use 
of military force in Libya in light of the humanitarian rights abuses being committed).  
Resolution 1973, issued on March 17, 2011, supplements Resolution 1970, issued on 
February 26, 2011.  Id.  Resolution 1970 referred the situation in Libya to the Prosecutor of 
the International Criminal Court and called for an arms embargo and asset freeze against 
the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya for continuing human rights violations, as well as instituted a 
travel ban against certain persons connected to the Libyan government and considered 
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also make future unilateral (i.e., without Security Council authorization) 
military action on such grounds more difficult to justify and perhaps 
even less likely to actually occur, if only due to UNSCR 1973’s 
precedential value, and will make the normative status of such unilateral 
intervention less uncertain than it has been in the past.  The passage of 
UNSCR 1973 reinforced the extant legal paradigm of non-intervention 
unless in self-defense or authorized by the Security Council, and 
buttressed the evolving international norm that grievous human rights 
abuses occurring solely within one state constitute a threat to 
international peace and security.3  Furthermore, it strengthened the 
concept of a collective international responsibility to act when a state 
fails to protect its population from grievous human rights abuses and 
reinforced a legal realist approach to such situations, though such 
collective responsibility has far to go before reaching peremptory norm 
status.  Critically, the capability to intervene at relatively minimal cost, 
especially in terms of exposure of U.S. troops to danger, played a large 
role in the lack of U.S. domestic public opposition to the intervention; 
this allowed the Obama administration to support the United Nations 
(“UN”) resolution and thus contribute to the above norm.  While the 
tension between state sovereignty plus peaceful relations among states 
and the protection of human rights has certainly not been resolved, the 
recent Libyan military intervention underscores the willingness of the 
international community to pursue UN-sanctioned action on grounds of 
protecting civilian populations, but only when all the stars align via a 
UN-sanctioned constellation. 
The UN Security Council’s March 2011 resolution, which allowed for 
all necessary means to protect civilians, does, at least facially, implement 
and reinforce the so-called “[r]esponsibility to protect” doctrine 
                                                                                                             
responsible for some of those violations. See S.C. Res. 1970, ¶¶ 4, 9–10, 15, 17, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011).  Resolution 1973 determined that the situation in Libya 
constituted a threat to international peace and security; demanded a cease-fire and end of 
violence against civilians; called for:  a no-fly zone over Libya, stronger enforcement of the 
arms embargo, a travel ban on additional individuals, and a complete flight ban in and out 
of Libya.  S.C. Res. 1973, supra, ¶¶ 4, 6, 8, 13, 17, 19.  It also authorized “all necessary 
measures . . . to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack.”  Id. ¶ 
4. 
3 See S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 2, ¶¶ 1, 7–8 (demonstrating the use of intervention in a 
non-international armed conflict by demanding a cease fire and establishing a no-fly zone 
in Libya, with the exception of humanitarian aid planes, and authorizing U.N. member 
states to enforce the no-fly zone); Alex J. Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? 
The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention After Iraq, 19 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 31, 33–34 
(2005) (concluding that such an international norm—that human rights abuses within one 
state constitute a threat to international peace and security—already exists). 
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endorsed by the international community in 2005.4  This principle, 
articulated by the international community in non-binding documents, 
recognizes an international—versus solely sovereign state—
responsibility to act in specific situations.  It provides that, “[e]ach 
individual [s]tate has the responsibility to protect its populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” 
and that the UN is “prepared to take collective action, in a timely and 
decisive manner, through the Security Council . . . on a case-by-case 
basis . . . should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities 
manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”5 
However, Security Council Resolution 1973 may not be unanimously 
viewed as a ringing vindication of the responsibility to protect doctrine 
because it was not driven solely by humanitarian motives to prevent 
crimes against humanity (though the expenditure of resources for 
collective military action rarely has been justified purely on 
humanitarian grounds, given the costs and complex societal processes 
necessary to gain support for such action, especially in democracies).  
While the grave potential for greater civilian slaughter was surely a 
major impetus behind UNSCR 1973 (the resolution itself states that the 
Libyan government’s actions may amount to crimes against humanity), 
the geopolitical tides of the Arab Spring played an even larger role in its 
passage.6  The need for a “powerful demonstration effect” to help other 
beleaguered citizens across the Arab world throw off dictatorial shackles 
cannot be discounted as a primary driving force of UNSCR 1973, at least 
by major western powers.7  Furthermore, the lack of love the Libyan 
leader engendered in his fellow regional leaders—as well as around the 
globe—surely helped the UNSCR’s passage, and helped solidify the rare 
support of such intervention by the Arab street.8 
Despite these non-humanitarian geopolitical dynamics, the 2011 UN-
authorized military intervention in Libya underscores a growing 
international consensus that a domestic humanitarian crisis can 
                                                 
4 See 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/L.1 ¶ 138, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/L.1 
(Sept. 15, 2005) [hereinafter 2005 World Summit Outcome] (articulating the responsibility 
to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against 
humanity). 
5 Id. ¶¶ 138–39. 
6 S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 2. 
7 Shadi Hamid, Lessons of the Libya Intervention, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 22, 2011), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/08/lessons-of-the-libya-
intervention/243922/. 
8 Stewart Patrick, Libya and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention, FOREIGN AFF. (Aug. 
26, 2011), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68233/stewart-patrick/libya-and-the-
future-of-humanitarian-intervention. 
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constitute a threat to international peace and security.  At the time of the 
resolution, fellow Arab states emphasized that “Libya was suffering 
heavily, with hundreds of victims dying and thousands displaced.”9  
Prior to the Security Council’s vote, the Arab League called for the UN to 
authorize a “no-fly zone” over Libya to create “safe zones” as a 
“humanitarian measure to protect Libyan civilians.”10  Even non-major 
world powers outside the Arab street concurred with the need for action.  
Colombia’s UN ambassador stated that:   
[H]is delegation was convinced that the purpose of the 
new resolution was essentially humanitarian and was 
conducive to bringing about conditions that would lead 
to the protection of civilians under attack from a regime 
that had lost all legitimacy.  The Council had acted 
because the Government, through its actions, had shown 
that it was not up to protecting and promoting the rights 
of its people.11 
At the time, President Obama stressed that Libya faced “brutal 
repression and a looming humanitarian crisis,” while also 
acknowledging the confluence of factors, which made intervention 
appropriate, such as “an international mandate for action, a broad 
coalition prepared to join us, the support of Arab countries, and a plea 
for help from the Libyan people themselves.  We also had the ability to 
stop Qaddafi’s forces in their tracks without putting American troops on 
the ground.”12  These humanitarian justifications supported calls for 
action specifically under the Security Council’s authority to act to 
remedy or prevent breaches to international peace and security.  World 
leaders also cited the geographical importance of Libya and the potential 
transnational strategic effects of a mass refugee exodus from Libya 
stemming from the humanitarian crisis—but their primary stated 
justification for military intervention focused squarely on the Libyan 
                                                 
9 U.N. Security Council, Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ Over Libya, Authorizing 
‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Absentions, U.N. 
Doc. SC/10200 (Mar. 17, 2011) [hereinafter Council Approves ‘No-Fly’ Zone]. 
10 Arab League Asks U.N. to Impose a No-fly Zone Over Libya to Protect Civilians from Air 
Attack, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 13, 2011), http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-03-
13/news/29139723_1_arab-league-zone-league-statement. 
11 Council Approves ‘No-Fly’ Zone, supra note 9. 
12 President Barack Obama, President of the United States of America, President 
Obama’s Speech on Libya (Mar. 28, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
photos-and-video/video/2011/03/28/president-obama-s-speech-libya#transcript 
[hereinafter Obama’s Speech on Libya]. 
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government’s alleged past and potential future crimes against humanity 
within its sovereign borders. 
These humanitarian justifications employed the concepts inherent in 
the responsibility to protect doctrine, as well as its language.  In his 
speech to the American people a few weeks after the Security Council’s 
vote, President Obama stated that “[t]o brush aside America’s 
responsibility as a leader and—more profoundly—our responsibilities to 
our fellow human beings under such circumstances would have been a 
betrayal of who we are.”13  This sentiment underscores the point made 
                                                 
13 Id.; see Dominic Evans, Gaddafi Wins Little Arab Sympathy as West Strikes, REUTERS (Mar. 
19, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/19/us-libya-arabs-reaction-idUSTRE7 
2I42T20110319 (discussing Arab street’s reaction to UNSCR 1973; highlighting Lebanon’s 
Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah’s comment).  “Today, unfortunately, as a result 
of most Arab and Muslim leaders abandoning their responsibilities, the door has been 
opened to foreign intervention in Libya and we do not know where matters are heading.”  
Id. (internal quotations omitted).  Nasrallah’s emphasis on the Arab world’s 
“responsibilities” demonstrates the conceptual shift from “rights” to “responsibilities” by 
nations regarding events previously considered in the domestic realm.  Id.  Other world 
leaders echoed this sentiment.  See Maria Golovina & Michael Georgy, Western Warplanes, 
Missiles Hit Libyan Targets, REUTERS (Mar. 19, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2011/03/19/us-libya-idUSTRE7270JP20110319 (quoting British Prime Minister David 
Cameron as saying “‘We cannot allow the slaughter of civilians to continue.’”); Nissa Rhee, 
Nations Weigh Imposing No-fly Zone On Libya, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 3, 2011), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/terrorism-security/2011/0303/Nations-weigh-
imposing-no-fly-zone-on-Libya (quoting Amr Moussa, the Arab League’s Secretary-
General as saying “The situation in Libya is sorrowful and it is not correct that we accept it 
or live with it, . . . . The Arab League will not stand with its hands tied while the blood of 
the brotherly Libyan people is spilt.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Arab League to 
Officially Request UN Impose No-fly Zone on Libya, HAARETZ.COM (Mar. 3, 2011), 
http://www.haaretz.com/news/international/arab-league-to-officially-request-un-
impose-no-fly-zone-on-libya-1.348747 (quoting Amr Moussa, Secretary-General of the Arab 
League as saying “The Arab League decided on Saturday that the ‘serious crimes and great 
violations’ the Libyan government had committed against its people had stripped it of 
legitimacy.”); Arab States Seek Libya No-fly Zone, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 12, 2011), 
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2011/03/201131218852687848.html (highlighting 
that despite opposition to the actual UNSCR authorizing intervention in Libya, the African 
Union still cited a need for outside intervention in Libya—just by other African states, and 
not via Western powers:  “‘urgent African action’” is needed to end the Libyan 
government’s action against its population, stated Ramtane Lamamra, head of the African 
Union’s Peace and Security Council).  Not all world leaders shared this sentiment, 
however.  See Venezuela’s Chavez Blasts Intervention in Libya, LATIN AMERICANIST BLOG (Mar. 
30, 2011), http://ourlatinamerica.blogspot.com/2011/03/venezuelas-chavez-blasts-
intervention.html (quoting Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez as saying “‘We don’t want 
outside strange elements in the region that come to alter the peace we need.’”); Vishnu 
Prakash, Use of Force is Not Acceptable to India; Not in Libya, Not Anywhere Else, DECCAN 
CHRONICLE (Mar. 31, 2011), http://www.deccanchronicle.com/360-degree/%E2%80% 
98use-force-not-acceptable-india-not-libya-not-anywhere-else%E2%80%99-903 (discussing 
statements by India’s spokesman of the Ministry of External Affairs, regarding why India 
did not support UNSCR 1973).  “We have always gone by the premise that use of force is 
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above:  that the responsibility to protect doctrine, infused in the lexicon 
of national leaders, gained significant traction as an evolving norm in 
international law via the Libyan intervention, albeit not in a vacuum.  
The resolution was largely based on the desire to prevent further civilian 
casualties by the Libyan government, and such preventative action was 
taken by and through the UN Security Council, in step with the 2005 
General Assembly’s articulation of this doctrine.  President Obama’s 
choice of words are especially interesting when coupled with the 
pronouncements made at the same time by his senior policy staff, such 
as those by then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, that Libya did not 
involve vital U.S. interests.14  Hence, the U.S. support of the Libyan 
intervention, despite an alleged lack of vital national interests, seems in 
step with the responsibility to protect norm’s emphasis on collective 
international action to protect human rights when they are gravely 
threatened, despite the lack of other national or international factors.  
Interestingly, only five months later, after the United States supported 
UNSCR 1973, President Obama unveiled his “Presidential Study 
Directive on Mass Atrocities,” which “define[d] the prevention of mass 
atrocities as both ‘a core national security interest and a core moral 
responsibility of the United States.’”15 
This document signals a shift toward the acceptance, at least by the 
United States, of a duty or moral obligation to intervene in such 
situations, versus the previously-prevailing concept of a “right” to 
intervene without any such moral duty or legal compulsion to do so.16  
Whether this potential acceptance is a step toward developing a legally 
binding international norm via shared opinio juris and state practice 
remains to be seen.17  What can be surmised today is that this automatic 
linkage, by one of the world’s leading powers, of the prevention of mass 
atrocities to its core national interests propels such prevention up the 
ladder of required state and international community action, in better 
                                                                                                             
unacceptable . . . [despite being] deeply concerned about the welfare of the people of 
Libya . . . .”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
14 Jon Hilsenrath, Gates Says Libya Not Vital US National Interest, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 
2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704308904576226704261420430. 
html. 
15 Patrick, supra note 8. 
16 See Holzgrefe, supra note 1, at 26–27 (articulating a tenet of natural law theory that 
views humanitarian intervention as a discretionary right versus moral obligation). 
17 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, June 26, 1945, available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0 (listing sources of 
international law); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES §§ 102, 103 (2011) (outlining constituent elements of customary international law). 
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alignment with the responsibility to protect doctrine.18  If prevention 
truly is a core national interest, and those interests are ones which a state, 
presumably, will use force to achieve if necessary, then most legal 
realists will agree that by equating the prevention of mass human 
suffering in another nation to one’s own core national interests moves 
humanitarian intervention closer to being “required,” at least 
pragmatically, if not morally.19 
So what relevance does an Essay on the 2011 Libyan humanitarian 
intervention have to this special edition Law Review, itself focused on jus 
in bello issues associated with the treatment of civilians who are directly 
participating in hostilities?  U.S. support of UNSCR 1973 actually 
highlights an interesting intersection of jus ad bellum and jus in bello that 
bears consideration—President Obama’s March speech justifying the 
Libyan intervention is telling in this regard:  “We also had the ability to 
stop Qaddafi’s forces in their tracks without putting American troops on 
the ground.”20  What was the linchpin of this stand-off capability that 
allowed the United States to participate without risking ground troops?  
Drones.  The United States’ use of remotely-piloted vehicles such as 
Predators constituted “a resumption of a direct combat role for U.S. 
aircraft in Libya” when the manned North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(“NATO”) aircraft were having difficulty locating the small groups of 
Libyan government forces who were using small weapons, such as 
mortars to target civilians and rebels.21  The Predator’s loiter ability—its 
ability to remain far above a specific location for hours at a time, with no 
risk to pilots, and collect vast amounts of extremely accurate 
intelligence—allows its operators to marry that real-time intelligence 
with the vehicle’s firepower, that is, to employ its Hellfire missiles 
against those Libyan units, which only surface for a brief period of time 
to launch their mortar attacks.22  This emerging capability to use drones 
to achieve strategic objectives with greater precision than achieved in 
any previous “no-fly zone,” without risking lives of pilots, may make 
                                                 
18 See Holzgrefe, supra note 1, at 30 (discussing how theorists such as Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 
who define national interests broadly, view certain humanitarian interventions as morally 
obligatory). 
19 See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Why the Gulf War Served the National Interest, ATLANTIC 
MONTHLY, July 1991, at 64 (discussing what constitutes national interests). 
20 Obama’s Speech on Libya, supra note 12. 
21 Dan Cloud, U.S. Begins Using Predator Drones in Libya, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2011, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/apr/22/world/la-fg-gates-libya-20110422. 
22 See U.S. Introduces Armed Predator Drones in Libya, ENGLISH.NEWS.CN (Apr. 22, 2011), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2011-04/22/c_13840190.htm (describing 
the unique capabilities of the drones deployed in Libya, including their ability to provide 
better vision of the ground and fly much longer periods of time than manned conventional 
planes). 
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policy makers increasingly inclined to intervene in such complex 
humanitarian interventions, since their nation’s risks and costs are 
substantially lower than at any other time in history. 
Imagine if President Clinton had had drones at his disposal when 
the UN sought U.S. support and assistance to prevent a looming 
genocide in Rwanda that fateful week in 1994.  As this Essay later 
discusses, President Clinton (and the majority of western powers) was 
hamstrung from supporting a UN intervention in Rwanda by the 1992 
debacle in Somalia during which a small number of U.S. service 
members died.  But if General Dallaire had come to the United States 
with a list of a few individuals whose “targeted killing” would prevent 
the looming slaughter of civilians, the deaths of hundreds of thousands 
of innocent Rwandans may have been prevented via the use of remotely-
piloted vehicles.23  The successful use of remotely-piloted vehicles in the 
UN-authorized Libyan intervention may embolden policy makers to use 
them with greater frequency, thus involving the United States in more 
use of force situations, which previously had been deemed too difficult 
for involvement.  The minimal exposure of U.S. service members to 
danger, made possible via use of weapon systems such as drones and 
Tomahawk missiles in the Libyan intervention, was a major component 
of the Obama administration’s conclusion that U.S. participation (at least 
by mid-June 2011) did not constitute “hostilities” under domestic 
legislation regarding separation of powers issues; this allowed the 
administration to continue such “non-hostilities” without congressional 
authorization.24 
This “non-hostilities” rationale underscores the above point:  that 
current capabilities may make interventions such as the one in Libya 
easier for policy makers to engage in, both technologically and politically 
(at least domestically regarding the latter).  If such use of remotely-
piloted vehicles emboldens policymakers to act in the name of the 
international community’s responsibility to protect, then there needs to 
be greater clarity regarding the targeting process and how and when 
                                                 
23 See generally UN General’s Rwandan Nightmares, BBC NEWS (July 5, 2000), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/820827.stm (discussing General Dallairs’s role in the 
UN peacekeeping mission in Rwanda and his “inability to prevent the mass killings of 
more than 800,000 Rwandans”). 
24 See Robert M. Chesney, A Primer on the Libya/War Powers Resolution Compliance Debate, 
BROOKINGS (June 17, 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0617_war_powers 
_chesney.aspx?p=1 (discussing the Obama administration’s conclusion that U.S. 
participation in the Libyan  no-fly zone no longer constituted hostilities as intended under 
the War Powers Resolution); see also Samantha Power, Bystanders to Genocide, ATLANTIC 
MONTHLY, Sept. 2001, at 86 (discussing the varied reasons the Clinton administration failed 
to intervene in Rwanda, including the “highly circumscribed understanding of what was 
‘possible’ for the United States to do”). 
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civilians become targets, especially if the United States does not believe 
these targeting actions amount to hostilities.  If such actions do not 
constitute hostilities, then what governing body of law applies?  Also, 
will these weapon systems likewise make future action, which is not 
approved by the Security Council, more likely?  While other articles and 
essays in this law review implicate the first question, this Essay 
addresses the second, and concludes that humanitarian intervention 
outside of the UN regime is less likely following the Libyan intervention, 
regardless of relative technological ease, because of the evolving 
fortification of the UN Charter’s (“the Charter”) paradigm for use of 
force. 
In summary, the following discussion clarifies how UNSCR 1973, 
which authorized the use of military force for the protection of Libyan 
citizens, is consistent with the Charter despite the absence of an explicit 
provision allowing for the use of force based on protecting human rights.  
Since the Charter allows the Security Council to approve the use of force 
to maintain or restore international peace and security, if the Security 
Council considers a situation as impacting international peace and 
authority, then it has the authority to act.  This pigeon-holing of 
humanitarian intervention into an “international peace and security” 
rubric is not new, as later discussed in this Essay.  Additionally, the 
Libyan intervention strengthens the expansion of this basis for Security 
Council action.  This Essay also explores the historical context, which 
leads this Author to conclude that UNSCR 1973 weakened the legal 
status of humanitarian intervention without Security Council 
authorization, concomitantly strengthened the Security Council’s role in 
approving such action, and reinforced the responsibility to protect 
doctrine. 
II.  LEGALITY OF UNSCR 1973 
Because both a sanction regime and military action in Libya were 
authorized by the Security Council instead of unilaterally conducted by 
one or more nations, the Libyan intervention strengthened the UN’s 
Westphalian system of collective security, which revolves around the 
sanctity of the state and constituent states’ acknowledgment of the 
Charter’s supremacy.25  Furthermore, the UN’s action in Libya restores 
some credibility to the United States and Great Britain whose credibility 
“as norm carriers” was weakened by the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the 
                                                 
25 Contra Allen Buchanan, Reforming the International Law of Humanitarian Intervention, in 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 1, at 130, 138–40 (discussing a different 
perspective regarding the UN system’s legitimacy). 
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subsequent protracted Iraq war.26  Both were key actors in building 
consensus in support of UNSCR 1973; perhaps success in Libya will 
make it easier for these and other states to persuade others to act 
decisively in “humanitarian emergencies,” despite earlier forecasts to the 
contrary.27 
Finally, and most critically for this Essay’s purposes, UNSCR 1973 
notably weakened the legal status of humanitarian intervention without 
Security Council authorization—a course of action many had argued was 
legally ambiguous, or even legally appropriate, following the NATO’s 
non-Security Council sanctioned intervention in Kosovo in 1999.28  Great 
Britain argued at the time that use of force could be justified in Kosovo 
without explicit Security Council authorization “‘on the grounds of 
overwhelming humanitarian necessity.’”29  Tony Blair, Britain’s Prime 
Minister at the time, expanded upon this theory in his 1999 speech in 
Chicago where he outlined five primary criteria to use when deciding 
whether intervention is warranted; he implied that Security Council 
authorization, while preferred, is not required.30  Belgium went even 
further in arguing that NATO’s unilateral military intervention in 
Kosovo was lawful because it was necessary to protect a jus cogens, and 
was consistent with both earlier Security Council resolutions and with 
Article 2(4).31  These positions highlight the point that many legal 
theorists and policymakers understood the unilateral NATO use of force 
on humanitarian grounds in Kosovo in 1999 as having “established the 
norm of resort to force without the authorisation [sic] of the UN Security 
Council.”32  This Essay explores the historical context, which led to that 
                                                 
26 Bellamy, supra note 3, at 32. 
27 Id. at 33. 
28 See Jane Stromseth, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention, in HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION, supra note 1, at 232, 239–40 (discussing the controversy behind the use of 
the Blair Doctrine in the Kosovo intervention). 
29 Id. at 236. 
30 Chris Abbott & John Sloboda, The ‘Blair Doctrine’ and After:  Five Years of Humanitarian 
Intervention, OPEN DEMOCRACY (Apr. 21, 2004), http://www.opendemocracy.net/print/ 
1857; see Chris Abbott, Rights and Responsibilities:  Resolving the Dilemma of Humanitarian 
Intervention, J. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, Sept. 2005, at 1, 4, available at 
http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/files/2011/04/a180.pdf (elucidating Blair criteria and effects of 
Blair proposal) [hereinafter Abbott, Rights and Responsibilities]; see also Stromseth, supra note 
28, at 240.  Prime Minister Blair did not ignore the UN system altogether, however; he 
linked support of the NATO military intervention in Kosovo to earlier Security Council 
Resolutions, stressing the consistency of purpose between the two.  Id. 
31 Stromseth, supra note 28, at 239; see also Provisional Measures, Legality of Use of Force 
(Serb. & Montenegro v. Belgium), ¶ II (May 10, 1999), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/105/4515.pdf (outlining Belgium’s arguments). 
32 Abbott & Sloboda, supra note 30; see Bellamy, supra note 3, at 34 (discussing how the 
Kosovar intervention was viewed as “a watershed’’ regarding acceptance of non-UN 
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argument, and how the recent Libyan intervention once again shifted the 
dialogue and impacted the legality and legitimacy of such action. 
A. Background:  Humanitarian Intervention and the Charter 
Humanitarian intervention refers to the non-consensual use or threat 
of use of military force against a state for the purpose of protecting 
people within that state—that is, to prevent or stop grave human rights 
abuses from being perpetrated within that state.33  This is neither a new 
concept, nor a new guise for the use of force for other reasons.34  The use 
of force for purely humanitarian reasons, and not simply as a cover for 
self-interested invasion, was promoted by the great naturalist Hugo 
Grotius, and some argue that humanitarian intervention constituted 
customary international law prior to passage of the Charter—there 
certainly was state practice to support such a stance.35 
However, the debatable customary law status of humanitarian 
intervention prior to the close of World War II was clarified by passage 
of the Charter in 1945, which established a new legal paradigm for the 
use of force.36  The Charter closed the door on non-UN approved use of 
force except in cases of self-defense.  In fact, when the Charter was being 
debated, the French advocated for an amendment that would have 
explicitly allowed humanitarian intervention without Security Council 
authorization.37  It was defeated out of sovereignty fears, and the debate 
                                                                                                             
authorized humanitarian intervention, and that it represented a general agreement that 
states have a “right” to intervene on such humanitarian grounds). 
33 See INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT 8 (2001), available at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf 
[hereinafter ICISS] (outlining generally accepted contours of what defines humanitarian 
intervention); see also Buchanan, supra note 25, at 130 (defining humanitarian intervention). 
34 See T. Modibo Ocran, The Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in Light of Robust 
Peacekeeping, 25 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 4–9 (2002) (discussing history of humanitarian 
intervention). 
35 Id. at 12. 
36 See generally U.N. Charter (establishing the creation of the UN); infra Part II.B 
(discussing the UN schema of international humanitarian law protections). 
37 See Stephen Carley, Limping Toward Elysium:  Impediments Created by the Myth of 
Westphalia on Humanitarian Intervention in the International Legal System, 41 CONN. L. REV. 
1741, 1770 (2009) (discussing the proposed 1945 amendment).  “[T]he enforcement powers 
chapter to allow UN intervention in cases where ‘the clear violation of essential liberties 
and of human rights constitute[d] in itself a threat capable of compromising peace.’”  Id.  
The French representative stated that the amendment “was in recognition of the historical 
experience of Nazism and the Holocaust, which had illustrated the desirability of 
international intervention for the purpose of protecting ‘certain unfortunate minorities.’”  
Id.  The French amendment was supported by China, but several countries, including 
Australia (which proposed the initial counter-amendment that would become the 
“domestic jurisdiction clause” of Article 2(7)), the United States, and the United Kingdom, 
opposed the French provision that would essentially give the UN the power to involve 
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surrounding it demonstrated the tension between what was then seen 
largely as a purely internal, domestic issue within the exclusive domain 
of the sovereign state, and an awareness that human rights should be 
respected and promoted by the international community.  This Essay 
clarifies how UNSCR 1973, which authorized the use of military force for 
the protection of Libyan citizens, is consistent with the Charter despite 
the absence of an explicit provision allowing for the use of force based on 
protecting human rights.  Since the Charter allows the Security Council 
to approve the use of force to maintain or restore international peace and 
security, if the Security Council considers a situation as impacting 
international peace and authority, then it has the authority to act. 
B. UN Schema 
The fundamental premise of the Charter is the prohibition of the use 
of force by its members except in self-defense or when authorized by the 
Security Council—and then only in cases to prevent aggression or 
restore/maintain international peace and security.38  Article 2(4) of the 
Charter states that “[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Purposes of the [UN].”39  In Chapter VII, the Charter gives the 
Security Council alone the authority to determine threats to international 
peace and security, breaches of that peace, or acts of aggression, and 
provides that the Security Council should decide what measures to take 
to maintain or restore international peace and security.40  Chapter VII, 
Article 42 stipulates that the Security Council “may take such action by 
air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.  Such action may include 
demonstrations, blockade[s], and other operations by air, sea, or land 
forces of Members of the [UN].”41  Chapter VII, Article 53 further 
specifies that regional organizations (for example, NATO) must first 
obtain Security Council authorization before engaging in “enforcement 
                                                                                                             
themselves in purely domestic affairs of member states.  Id.  Even in 1945, Article 2(7) as it 
was adopted was considered “‘potentially the most substantial limitation that is to be 
found anywhere in the whole Charter upon the activity of the [UN].’”  Id. at 1772 (citations 
omitted). 
38 U.N. Charter art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the 
[UN], until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international 
peace and security.”). 
39 Id. at art. 2, ¶ 4. 
40 Id. at arts. 39, 41–42. 
41 Id. at art. 42. 
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action” (that is, the use of force for maintaining or restoring international 
peace and security).42 
In other words, the Charter, whose primary purpose is to maintain 
international peace and security, gives the Security Council a monopoly 
on enforcement measures against aggression and breaches of 
international peace and security.43  The Charter places a premium on 
                                                 
42 Id. at art 53, ¶ 1; see Richard N. Gardner, A Life in International Law and Diplomacy, 44 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 7 (2005) (discussing the 1962 United States naval quarantine of 
Cuba and the explanation of the United States before the UN for why the quarantine was 
not a blockade, and therefore an act of war); Suyash Paliwal, The Primacy of Regional 
Organization in International Peacekeeping:  The African Example, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 185, 193–94 
(2010) (recognizing a contrast between “[t]he weight of scholarly opinion . . . that 
‘enforcement action’ [under Article 2(4)] includes all . . . uses of force by regional 
organizations” including peacekeeping measures, but that “peacekeeping operations by 
regional organizations in accordance with a constitutive treaty framework against one of 
the organization’s members do not constitute ‘enforcement actions’ within the meaning of 
Article 53” (citations omitted)).  The United States cited Article 53 of the UN Charter and 
argued that although regional organizations cannot take enforcement action without 
Security Council approval, “because the quarantine had a very limited purpose and was 
authorized, not commanded, by the [Organization of American States],” it was not 
technically an enforcement action.  Id.; see also Ugo Villani, The Security Council’s 
Authorization of Enforcement Action by Regional Organizations, 6 MAX PLANCK U.N.Y.B. L. 535, 
538–39 (2002) (discussing whether regional organization enforcement measures requiring 
Security Council approval “consist of enforcement measures of any type, or whether such 
authorization is only necessary for . . . cases involving the use of armed force (or . . . the 
threat of such force)” and concluding that “the enforcement measures which are 
subordinate to the Security Council’s authorization are only those involving the use (or the 
threat) of armed force” because “enforcement measures . . . of a commercial, diplomatic or 
financial nature, are not forbidden by the Charter”).  As the Charter only explicitly 
prohibits the use of armed force as a tool of international relations in Article 2(4), other 
enforcement measures used as tools of international relations do not require authorization.  
Id. 
43 Contra Paliwal, supra note 42, at 194 (“[A]pproval or commendation of a regional 
enforcement action after it has taken place satisfies the authorization requirement of Article 
53(1), often pointing to the Security Council’s treatment of [the Economic Community Of 
West African States’] 1990 intervention in Liberia.” (citations omitted)).  Although 
ECOWAS intervened in Liberia without first obtaining Security Council authorization 
under Article 53(1), the Security Council later “‘[c]ommend[ed] ECOWAS for its efforts to 
restore peace, security and stability to the conflict in Liberia’” resulting in an interpretation 
that the Security Council’s post hoc commendation constituted appropriate “authorization 
for a regional enforcement action.”  Id. at 195 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).  
Thus, there is some precedent for occurrences of enforcement actions constituting technical 
Article 53 violations being approved by the Security Council after the action has already 
occurred.  See, e.g., S.C. Res. 788, ¶¶ 1–2, 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/788 (Nov. 19, 1992) 
(“Commend[ing] ECOWAS for its efforts to restore peace, security and stability in 
Liberia; . . . call[ing] upon ECOWAS to continue its efforts to assist in the peaceful 
implementation of [the Yamoussoukro IV] Accord; . . . [and] [c]ondemn[ing] the continuing 
armed attacks against the peace-keeping forces of ECOWAS in Liberia by one of the parties 
to the conflict.”). 
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state sovereignty and peaceful relations among states.44  It reinforces “an 
international state order dependent on the sovereignty of states and the 
inviolability of their territory.”45  Article 2(4)’s prohibition against the use 
of force is complemented by Article 2(7)’s policy of non-intervention by 
the UN in states’ domestic affairs—except when authorized by the 
Security Council via its Chapter VII powers.  Article 2(7) stipulates that:   
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize 
the UN to intervene in matters which are essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall 
require the Members to submit such matters to 
settlement under the present Charter; but this principle 
shall not prejudice the application of enforcement 
measures under Chapter VII.46 
While Article 2(7) has been used to oppose actions taken solely on 
humanitarian grounds—including those not sanctioned by the UN, 
exemplified by India’s protests against the NATO bombing of Kosovo in 
1999—it is generally agreed that Article 2(7) only limits action by the 
UN, whereas Article 2(4) limits states.47  Per its text, Article 2(7) does not 
apply to UN enforcement measures, which include all binding decisions 
made by the Security Council under Chapter VII.48  But it nonetheless 
has been used generally to oppose both unilateral, non-UN approved 
intervention on humanitarian grounds, as well as to oppose Security 
Council authorization for the same.49 
The Charter’s collective security paradigm, an attempt to banish 
World War II and its ilk to the historical dustbin, includes a stated carve-
out to the prohibition against force via the customary international law 
concept of self-defense.50  It allows states to use force in self-defense if 
attacked, but not for any other reason (such as to stop a state from 
                                                 
44 Buchanan, supra note 25, at 131. 
45 See ICISS, supra note 33, at VII (raising the issue of the policy conflict between 
preserving state sovereignty and the necessity of humanitarian intervention in the 
sovereign territory of a state). 
46 U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 7. 
47 Kawser Ahmed, The Domestic Jurisdiction Clause in the United Nations Charter:  A 
Historical View, 10 SING. Y.B. INT’L L. 175, 184 (2006). 
48 Id. at 186. 
49 See Council Approves ‘No-Fly’ Zone, supra note 9.  China, when explaining its vote of 
abstention regarding UNSCR 1973, made reference to the fact that the “Charter must be 
respected,” implying that perhaps Article 2(7) was being violated by the resolution in some 
manner.  Id. 
50 PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 27 
(7th rev. ed. 1999). 
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perpetrating gross human rights violations within its own borders).51  In 
addition to the Charter’s prohibition on the use of force, it also promotes 
and maintains state sovereignty through the Security Council itself:  
Only the Security Council can authorize, by an affirmative vote of nine 
members, the use of force against a member state by other member 
state(s), and the five permanent members of the Security Council hold 
veto power.52  In other words, of the fifteen Security Council members, 
all five permanent members (United States, United Kingdom, France, 
China, and Russia) must either authorize the proposed action or abstain 
from voting.53  This voting procedure has historically posed a high 
hurdle for those seeking authorization to use force—especially true for 
the majority of the Security Council’s existence, shadowed as it was for 
almost fifty years by the Cold War.54  But it can also be viewed as an 
important check on the UN’s power, thus ensuring that any collective 
action has the imprimatur of the five permanent members as well as 
most others.55 
Not only did the permanent party veto power stymie much Security 
Council action, it frequently neutered the entire UN collective security 
regime during much of the Cold War.  The former Soviet Union 
exercised its veto power 114 times between 1945 and 1992, and the 
United States sixty-nine times during that same period.56  Such 
                                                 
51 Compare U.N. Charter art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a 
Member of the [UN].”), with id. ¶ 7 (“Nothing contained in the present Charter shall 
authorize the [UN] to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement 
under the present Charter . . . .”). 
52 U.N. Charter art. 27, ¶¶ 1–2. 
53 See id. (outlining the voting procedure for Security Council decisions). 
54 Eric A. Posner & John Yoo, International Law and the Rise of China, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 6 
(2006).  The Cold War period was marked by decades of Security Council deadlock due to 
the permanent members exercising their veto power:   
After the Korean War—when UN intervention was made possible only 
because the Soviet Union boycotted the Security Council vote in 
connection with another issue—the Security Council was never able to 
authorize the use of force to counter Cold War-era military aggression.  
If the aggression served Soviet interests, the USSR would veto any 
proposed resolution; if the aggression served American interests, the 
[United States] would veto any proposed resolution. 
Id. 
55 See generally Niels Blokker, Is the Authorization Authorized?  Powers and Practice of the 
UN Security Council to Authorize the Use of Force by ‘Coalitions of the Willing’, 11 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 541 (2000) (discussing various perspectives on the role of the Security Council). 
56 Global Policy Forum, Changing Patterns in the Use of the Veto in the Security Council, 
GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, http://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/Z/Tables_and_ 
Charts/useofveto.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2012). 
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impotency led to an evolving acknowledgment, within and among 
nations, that action taken without Security Council authorization, when 
approved by the majority of the General Assembly, could be legitimate.57  
The General Assembly passed the “Uniting for Peace” UNGA Resolution 
377 in 1950 in an attempt to allow the General Assembly to act in 
situations that affected international peace and security but in which the 
Security Council was unable to act.58  This resolution called on the 
General Assembly to immediately meet and issue non-binding 
recommendations, including those recommending the collective use of 
armed force, when the Security Council failed to maintain international 
peace and security.59  It created “emergency special session[s]” of the 
General Assembly,60 and was first utilized during the Suez Crisis in 1956, 
in which the United States and USSR teamed together to successfully call 
for the withdrawal of Israel, France, and Great Britain from Egypt.61  
Emergency sessions have been used to call on South Africa to end its 
illegal occupation of Namibia and to deal with UN membership for 
Palestine.62 
While the Uniting for Peace resolution claimed for the General 
Assembly a “subsidiary responsibility with regard to international peace 
                                                 
57  MALANCZUK, supra note 50, at 392. 
58 See generally Uniting for Peace Resolution, G.A. Res. 377 (V), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1775 
(Nov. 3, 1950) (giving the General Assembly authority to act to maintain international 
peace and security when the Security Council is unable to act). 
59 MALANCZUK, supra note 50, at 393; see also Uniting for Peace Resolution, supra note 58, 
¶ A(1) (declaring that the United Nations General Assembly can authorize the use of force 
for breaches of the peace or acts of aggression if the Security Council fails to act to address 
the situation and the failure to act is due to the negative vote of a permanent member.)  The 
Uniting for Peace Resolution also includes collective measures where there is a “threat to 
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.”  Id. 
60 Uniting for Peace Resolution, supra note 58, ¶ A(1).  The Resolution allows for the 
General Assembly to bypass a Security Council stalemate in the event of Security Council 
deadlock paired with a necessity to act.  Id.  The General Assembly may thereafter call an 
emergency meeting on the issue in the following manner:   
If not in session at the time, the General Assembly may meet in 
emergency special session within twenty-four hours of the request 
therefor.  Such emergency special session shall be called if requested 
by the Security Council on the vote of any seven members, or by a 
majority of the Members of the [UN]. 
Id. 
61 MALANCZUK, supra note 50, at 393. 
62 See Christian Tomuschat, Uniting for Peace General Assembly Resolution 377(V), 
AUDIOVISUAL LIBR. INT’L L., http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/ufp/ufp.html (last 
visited Oct. 4, 2011).  To date ten special sessions have been called under the Uniting for 
Peace Resolution.  Id.; see also Emergency Special Sessions, U.N. GEN. ASSEMBLY, 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/sessions/emergency.shtml (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) 
(providing a list of instances where emergency special sessions have been called). 
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and security” based on Article 14 of the Charter,63 this resolution 
continued to recognize the primacy of the Security Council in these 
matters.64  Furthermore, it implicitly recognized that the UN was the 
means to authorize the use of armed force in the international arena—
that is, it did not acknowledge that Security Council inaction could allow 
nations to use armed force without any type of UN authorization 
whatsoever.  Instead, it simply moved the source of the authorization to 
the General Assembly when the Security Council failed to act.65  While 
the need for such emergency sessions dramatically declined due both to 
the end of the Cold War and because the General Assembly began to 
meet more frequently outside of special sessions, the Uniting for Peace 
Resolution is noteworthy because it opened the door for many to 
question whether Security Council authorization is always required 
prior to the use of armed force.66 
III.  EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
The Charter has always included the promotion and encouragement 
of respect for human rights, but the Security Council’s approval of 
UNSCR 1973 specifically to protect the Libyan civilian population must 
be placed in context of the tremendous growth of  human rights on the 
international stage since the UN’s inception.67  Since the passage of the 
                                                 
63 Tomuschat, supra note 62. 
64 Uniting for Peace Resolution, supra note 58, at 10 (“Reaffirming the importance of the 
exercise by the Security Council of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security . . . .”). 
65 See generally id. (stating the General Assembly already had the power to issue non-
binding resolutions, but the Uniting for Peace Resolution strengthened the Assembly’s role 
regarding the maintenance of international peace and security). 
66 See Tomuschat, supra note 62 (noting the shifting of responsibilities to the General 
Assembly and questioning the importance of Security Council authorization). 
67 U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶¶ 1–4. The first article in the Charter establishes the purposes of 
the UN as:   
1. To maintain international peace and security 
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for 
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to 
take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace 
3. To achieve international cooperation in solving international 
problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, 
and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction . . . ; and 
4. To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the 
attainment of these common ends. 
Id.  Article 55 states that the UN shall promote the following economic and social concerns 
in order to pursue its goals of international peace, stability, and friendly cooperation:   
a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions 
of economic and social progress and development; 
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Charter, there has been tremendous growth in treaty development and 
other international attempts to provide substantive protection of human 
rights—a movement toward the gradual erosion of the once-ironclad 
concept that the relationship between a state and its own nationals is 
purely an internal state matter.  This development of human rights on 
the international level, in tension with the Westphalian international 
order of pure state sovereignty and its concept of internal domestic 
control, resulted in documents such as the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the 1948 Genocide Convention, the 1984 Convention 
Against Torture, and the 1976 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.68  The UN established the Commission on Human 
Rights in 1946 and the General Assembly created the post of High 
Commissioner for Human Rights in 1993.69  During this same timeframe, 
regional organizations developed various human rights protocols such 
as the 1953 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms.70  This convention is legally binding on its 
signatories, unlike the aspirational Universal Declaration, and establishes 
                                                                                                             
b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and 
related problems; and international cultural and educational 
cooperation; and  
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language, or religion. 
U.N. Charter art. 55. 
68 See generally Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 1987 (requiring states to both 
prevent torture within their borders and to consider whether other states engage in torture 
prior to transferring individuals to those states, thus mandating states review what had 
been previously considered an internal state matter); International Convention on Civil and 
Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (highlighting the growing priority the 
international community is placing on human rights, including political and civil rights); 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 
U.N.T.S 278 (codifying the peremptory norm against genocide); Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 
(Dec. 8, 1948) (establishing specific human rights for global protection, transcending 
sovereign state borders). 
69 What We Do, U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS:  OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS (Feb. 2009), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/Pages/WhatWeDo.aspx.  The 
purpose of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights is to “speak[] out 
objectively in the face of human rights violations worldwide, provide[] a forum for 
identifying, highlighting and developing responses to today’s human rights challenges, 
and act[] as the principal focal point of human rights research, education, public 
information, and advocacy activities in the [UN] system.”  Id. 
70 See generally Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/ 
EN/Treaties/Html/005.htm [hereinafter European Convention] (creating obligations to 
protect human rights). 
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the European Court of Human Rights to render binding decisions 
regarding complaints against state parties.71 
A. Enforcement of Human Rights:  International Peace and Security 
This burgeoning international human rights superstructure did not 
bring with it separate global enforcement mechanisms outside of the 
Security Council’s exclusive authority to both determine threats to 
international peace and security and to authorize military action to deal 
with said threats.  The growing internationalization of the protection of 
human rights within the domestic jurisdiction of a sovereign state, along 
with the end of the Cold War Security Council dynamics, led to the 
greater use of humanitarian justifications for military interventions into 
sovereign states, when either the state itself was committing gross 
human rights abuses, failing to do anything to stop such abuses, or 
failing to alleviate mass human suffering.  Even before the end of the 
Cold War, there were several instances of unilateral state intervention, 
undertaken at least partially on humanitarian grounds, which positively 
contributed to the notion that domestic mass human rights abuses were 
matters of concern to the international community.72  However, these 
instances also underscored that the international community wanted 
such interventions to occur with a UN imprimatur.  Security Council 
approval (or at least General Assembly support garnered via a Uniting 
for Peace process) was desired to act as a check and balance against 
ulterior motives by intervening nations, and to allay weaker nations’ 
fears that they would be unilaterally invaded on human rights grounds. 
These Cold War instances include:  Tanzania’s armed intervention in 
Uganda in 1979 to overthrow Ida Amin; Vietnam’s armed intervention in 
Cambodia in 1978 “against Pol Pot’s genocidal regime[;]” and India’s 
armed “response to Pakistan’s . . . human rights violations” in East 
Pakistan in 1971.73  These cases seemed to indicate a willingness by the 
world community to consider that mass human rights abuses 
occasionally justify the use of force by another nation—that is, that 
humanitarian crises can overcome Article 2(7)’s non-intervention norm 
and justify forcible violations of sovereignty.  These interventions have 
even been cited as representing that the UN will “acquiesce in unilateral 
intervention under certain circumstances.”74  However, non-intervention 
                                                 
71 See id. at art. 1 (“The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their 
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention.”). 
72 See Buchanan, supra note 25, at 130 (stating that several such interventions had moral 
justifications). 
73 See id. (discussing the primary motivation for these interventions). 
74 Robert O. Keohane, Introduction to HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 1, at 1, 6. 
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in the domestic matters of another state, even for humanitarian 
purposes, remained the stated default for decades.75  The sovereignty 
fears such unilateral actions prompted in states are seen in the 1970 
United Nations Declaration on Friendly Relations and its emphasis that 
“[n]o [s]tate or group of [s]tates has the right to intervene, directly or 
indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of 
any other [s]tate.”76 
While India defended its 1971 incursion into East Pakistan and 
eventual defeat of Pakistani forces on self-defense grounds (citing the 
impact of millions of refugees into its country), it also indicated that it 
needed to protect the victims of Pakistan’s policies within East 
Pakistan.77  During Security Council deliberations on India’s offensive, 
the Indian representative said that “we have on this particular occasion 
absolutely nothing but the purest of motives and the purest of intentions:  
to rescue the people of East Bengal from what they are suffering.”78  
While a large majority of the UN nations condemned India’s action, 
despite the well-documented slaughter being perpetrated by Pakistan, 
the Security Council failed to pass a resolution calling for the withdrawal 
of Indian troops, and the resultant state of Bangladesh was only 
admitted to the UN three years later.79  Thomas Franck and others have 
highlighted that most states at the time felt threatened by a powerful 
country unilaterally invading a weaker one, and “that one state could sit 
in judgment on another’s compliance with human rights and 
humanitarian law.”80  But the “extreme necessity” of Pakistan’s crimes 
against humanity in East Pakistan seemed to mute formal condemnation 
of India’s action.81 
                                                 
75 Michael Byers & Simon Chesterman, Changing the Rules About Rules? Unilateral 
Humanitarian Intervention and the Future of International Law, in HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION, supra note 1, at 177, 183. 
76 Id. at 183 n.22 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
77 Thomas M. Franck, Interpretation and Change in the Law of Humanitarian Intervention, in 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 1, at 209, 216. 
78 U.N. SCOR, 26th Sess., 1606th mtg. at 18, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1606 (Dec. 4, 1971).  The 
Indian representative continued, “this is the fourth time Pakistan has committed 
aggression against India. . . . We reserve our right to take . . . all appropriate and necessary 
measures to safeguard our security and defen[s]e against aggression from Pakistan.”  Id. at 
32; see also INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT:  RESEARCH, BIBLIOGRAPHY, BACKGROUND nn.54–75 and accompanying text (2001), 
available at http://web.idrc.ca/openebooks/963-1/#rch4fn54 [hereinafter INT’L COMM’N] 
(discussing events leading up to India’s 1971 intervention in East Pakistan after reports of 
the persecution and offenses committed against the Hindu population in East Pakistan). 
79 Franck, supra note 77, at 217. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
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There was similar precedential fear regarding Vietnam’s invasion of 
Cambodia, which it justified both on self-defense and humanitarian 
grounds.82  Thirteen of the fifteen Security Council members supported a 
resolution calling for the immediate withdrawal of Vietnamese troops, 
and Portugal typified the response of both western and non-aligned 
powers:   
Neither do we have any doubts about the appalling 
record of violation of the most basic and elementary 
human rights in Kampuchea . . . . [Nonetheless], there 
are no nor can there be any socio-political considerations 
that would justify the invasion of the territory of a 
sovereign [s]tate by the forces of another [s]tate . . . . 83 
But the very fact that Vietnam felt it useful to employ humanitarian 
grounds to justify its actions, and that other nations acknowledged such 
rationale, though without validating it, was a step towards recognizing 
its notional legitimacy. 
Both India’s and Vietnam’s violations of Article 2(4) were seen by the 
world as motivated by the self-interest of the invading countries—
invading nations with unclean hands who stood to greatly benefit by 
their incursions, irrespective of humanitarian concerns.84  Their self-
interested motives overshadowed the human rights violations that their 
interventions helped ameliorate.  Therefore states chose the non-
intervention norm despite any moral issues regarding human suffering 
at play.85  However, Tanzania’s action in Uganda demonstrated a 
violation of the non-intervention norm, which many states actually 
supported.  The UN acquiesced in Tanzania’s two-year occupation of 
Uganda; Tanzania was not seen as possessing “ulterior motives or 
strategic designs” comparable to Vietnam and India.86  Instead, 
Tanzania’s action was welcomed by the world community as ridding 
Uganda of Idi Amin’s murderous reign.87  While Tanzania did not 
formally claim humanitarian reasons for its invasion, instead relying on 
self-defense against minor border incursions, its occupation of Uganda 
was hugely disproportionate to this claim of self-defense, and the world 
                                                 
82 Id. at 218. 
83 INT’L COMM’N, supra note 78, at n.59 (quoting U.N. SCOR, 24th Sess., 2110th mtg. at 3, 
U.N. Doc. S/PV.2110 (Jan. 13, 1979)). 
84 Franck, supra note 77, at 217–18. 
85 Id. at 219. 
86 Id. at 218. 
87 Id. at 219. 
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accordingly viewed it as one appropriately executed on humanitarian 
grounds.88 
B. Post-Cold War and 1990s Developments 
The end of the Cold War ushered in a new period of unprecedented 
Security Council activism, as well as a decrease in unilateral use of 
armed force by the United States.89  Between 1990 and 1995, Chapter VII 
collective measures in the form of binding Article 41 sanctions were 
authorized by the Security Council in Iraq, Liberia, the former 
Yugoslavia, Somalia, Libya, Angola, Haiti, and Rwanda.90  The Security 
Council authorized the use of force five times during this period:  in Iraq, 
Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Haiti.91  This activism was 
accompanied by a growing realization among the international 
community that the protection of human rights was no longer an 
exclusive matter for each particular state.  This realization was 
demonstrated by the Security Council’s expansion of its interpretation of 
“international peace and security” in the 1990s.92  It authorized Chapter 
VII peace enforcement military interventions on humanitarian grounds 
in Bosnia in 1999 to protect civilians;93 Somalia in 1992 to protect aid 
supplies and maintain law and order;94 and in Haiti in 1994 to restore 
                                                 
88 Id.; see also Buchanan, supra note 25, at 130 (stating that several such interventions had 
moral justifications). 
89 MALANCZUK, supra note 50, at 395. 
90 Id. at 396. 
91 Id. 
92 Bellamy, supra note 3, at 34. 
93 S.C. Res. 836, U.N. Doc. S/RES/836 (June 4, 1993). 
94 S.C. Res. 794, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (Dec. 3, 1992).  In Resolution 794, the Security 
Council addressed the continuing international concerns on the state of Somalia following 
the coup against President Mohamed Siad Barre in 1992.  Id.  The Security Council met six 
times in 1992 regarding the situation in Somalia; in its December 3, 1992 meeting, the 
Security Council passed a resolution regarding Somalia containing the following 
provisions:   
Dismayed by the continuation of conditions that impede the delivery 
of humanitarian supplies to destinations within Somalia, and in 
particular reports of looting of relief supplies destined for starving 
people, attacks on aircraft and ships bringing in humanitarian relief 
supplies 
 . . . [and] 
Determined further to restore peace, stability and law and order with a 
view to facilitating the process of a political settlement under the 
auspices of the [UN], aimed at national reconciliation . . . . 
Id. at 2.  The Security Council also 
[s]trongly condemns all violations of international humanitarian law 
occurring in Somalia, including in particular the deliberate impeding 
of the delivery of food and medical supplies essential for the survival 
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democracy.95  The Security Council resolutions authorizing these 
incursions demonstrated the evolving norm that the protection of human 
rights was part and parcel of international peace and security, and it was 
incumbent upon the Security Council to act per its Charter values.96  In 
1991, the UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuallar stated that, “the 
principle of non-interference with the essential domestic jurisdiction of 
[s]tates cannot be regarded as a protective barrier behind which human 
rights could be massively or systematically violated with impunity”—a 
much different message than contained in the 1970 United Nations 
Declaration on Friendly Relations.97  Boutrous Boutrous-Ghali, in his 
1992 Agenda for Peace address to the Security Council, stated: 
The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, 
however, has passed; its theory was never matched by 
reality.  It is the task of leaders of [s]tates today to 
understand this and to find a balance between the needs 
of good internal governance and the requirements of an 
ever more interdependent world.98 
But was this expansion of the meaning of international peace and 
security an ultra vires act by the Security Council?  While “enforcement 
measures” under Chapter VII can only be taken to address threats to or 
breaches of international peace and security, or respond to acts of 
aggression, the Charter never defines what such threats or breaches 
include, nor does it define the concept of “international peace and 
security.”  This definitional lacuna left the door open for the Security 
Council to include domestic human rights abuses as constituting such 
threats and/or breaches.  In fact, the drafters of the Charter indicated 
that they wanted this phrase to be flexible.99  An expanding notion of 
what constitutes a threat to international peace and security developed 
despite such intervention’s tension with Article 2(7)’s protection of 
                                                                                                             
of the civilian population, and affirms that those who commit or order 
the commission of such acts will be held individually responsible in 
respect of such acts. 
Id. at 3, ¶ 5. 
95 S.C. Res. 940, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (July 31, 1994). 
96 Bellamy, supra note 3, at 34. 
97 U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, at 
5, U.N. Doc. A/46/1 (Sept. 13, 1991); see also Byers & Chesterman, supra note 75, at 183 
(describing the non-intervention stance in the 1970 U.N. Declaration on Friendly Relations). 
98 U.N. Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace:  Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and 
Peace-Keeping:  Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. A/47/277-S/24111 (June 17, 
1992). 
99 See Holzgrefe, supra note 1, at 40. 
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internal, domestic matters as outside the scope of the UN, a tension 
already lessened somewhat by the various human rights treaties and 
earlier interventions as described above.100 
In fact, according to theorists such as Alex Bellamy, it is now “widely 
accepted that the Security Council has a legal right to authorize 
humanitarian intervention under Chapter VII of the Charter.”101  
However, despite this claimed international acceptance of the legitimacy 
of UN-sanctioned intervention on humanitarian grounds, the 
appropriateness of humanitarian intervention both with such a UN 
imprimatur and without remained the object of significant public debate 
following several such uses of force in the 1990s.102  The tripartite 
intervention into northern Iraq by Great Britain, the United States, and 
France in 1991, in order to shelter the Kurds from Sadam Hussein’s 
human rights abuses, was not explicitly authorized by the UN, yet never 
condemned by it either.103  Several years later, NATO’s non-UNSCR 
authorized humanitarian intervention in Yugoslavia in the late 1990’s 
sharply focused global attention in both the academic and international 
political arenas on whether such non-UN-authorized action was legally 
defensible.104 
                                                 
100 U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 7.  This section states: 
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the [UN] to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such 
matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall 
not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter 
VII. 
Id.  Chapter VII enforcement measures include discretionary preliminary measures, 
interruption of economic relations, interruption of mediums of communication, severance 
of diplomatic relations, and military or non-military air, sea, or land operations “necessary 
to maintain or restore international peace and security.”  U.N. Charter, art. 40–42. 
101 Bellamy, supra note 3, at 33. 
102 Franck, supra note 77, at 224–25. 
103 See Heval Hylan, 1991 Humanitarian Intervention in Kurdistan and Iraq’s Sovereignty, 1, 
56–57, available at http://kcdme.com/Humanitarian20Intervention1.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 
2011) (arguing that the intervention was legal). 
104 Won Kidane, Managing Forced Displacement by Law in Africa:  The Role of the New African 
Union IDPS Convention, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 46−47 (2011) (discussing the Security 
Council’s failure to intervene in the Kosovo genocide).  This “prompted NATO to act 
without . . . authorization . . . [which] was illegal on a technical level under the UN 
Charter” but such necessity could be legitimized in the future by amending “the UN 
Charter to facilitate collective intervention in circumstances of aggression or gross human 
rights violations.”  Id.  Kidane continues by arguing that:   
Kosovo demonstrates yet again a compelling need to address the 
deficiencies in the law and practice of the UN Charter.  The sometimes-
compelling need for humanitarian intervention (as at Kosovo), like the 
compelling need for responding to interstate aggression (as against 
Iraq over Kuwait), brings home again the need for responsible reaction 
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However, it was the global community’s failure to stop the Rwandan 
genocide in 1994, despite a new post-Cold War Security Council 
unfettered by US-USSR rivalries, which sharpened the focus on when, 
why, and how humanitarian intervention should occur.  This was 
followed by NATO’s illegal humanitarian intervention in Kosovo in 
1999.105  While NATO’s action violated the Charter,106 it, and the 
situation in Rwanda earlier, reflected larger issues:  the world 
community’s failure to prevent and stop such mass human rights 
violations in the first place, and the growing recognition that the 
protection of human rights fell no longer within the domestic province of 
states alone.  World leaders, such as Great Britain’s Tony Blair, argued 
that military intervention in third-world countries was necessary and 
legitimate in order to safeguard human rights, even without Security 
Council authorization.107  That is, there existed an “unacceptable gap 
between what international law allows and what morality requires.”108 
                                                                                                             
to gross violations of the Charter, or to massive violations of human 
rights, by responsible forces acting in the common interest. 
Id. at n.301. 
105 See also Buchanan, supra note 25, at 130 (referring to the NATO action as illegal, 
assumedly because not authorized by the Security Council). 
106 Id.  As did numerous other state actions taken on humanitarian grounds, such as 
Tanzania’s overthrow of Idi Amin’s regime in Uganda in 1979.  Id. 
107 See Tony Blair, Prime Minister, U.K. of Gr. Brit. & N. Ir., Address to the Chicago 
Economic Club (Apr. 22, 1999), available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/ 
content/article/154/26026.html [hereinafter Blair comments] (discussing criteria for 
evaluating when a state could justify intervening in the internal affairs of another state on 
humanitarian grounds).  “The most pressing foreign policy problem we face is to identify 
the circumstances in which we should get actively involved in other people’s conflicts.”  
Id.; see also Byers & Chesterman, supra note 75, at 199 (discussing the U.S. Secretary of 
State’s emphasis on the exceptional nature of Kosovo and implying that UN authorization 
was normally required whereas U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair “suggested that such 
interventions might become more routine”); Stromseth, supra note 28, at 239 (highlighting 
that “the United States declined to embrace a doctrine of humanitarian intervention” 
following Kosovo, such as that outlined by Blair, that was unmoored from the UN Charter; 
also discussing that the United States, when agreeing to participate in a NATO 
intervention, emphasized previous UN resolutions which labeled the situation in Kosovo 
as a threat to international peace and security).  The U.S. approach to Kosovo was mirrored 
in the justifications given by the U.S. government regarding the 2003 invasion of Iraq:  it 
obsessively emphasized its actions as consistent with, and the implementation of, prior UN 
resolutions.  Id.; see John B. Bellinger III, Authority for Use of Force by the United States Against 
Iraq Under International Law, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Apr. 10, 2003), 
http://www.cfr.org/world/authority-use-force-united-states-against-iraq-under-
international-law/p5862 (discussing why previous UN Security Council authorizations 
provided sufficient legal authority under the UN Charter to allow for use of force against 
Iraq). 
108 Buchanan, supra note 25, at 131. 
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C. Somalia Effect:  Rwanda 
So if there was a growing recognition of the propriety of Security 
Council intervention in domestic matters when human rights were at 
issue, why did the Security Council fail to authorize armed intervention 
in Rwanda, when over 800,000 people were slaughtered in 100 days?109  
As pointed out by numerous scholars, it is telling that no state argued 
that the Security Council lacked authority to intervene in Rwanda’s 
internal domestic crises during the Security Council’s deliberations on 
the matter.110  Instead, the UN’s then-recent failure in Somalia was cited 
as the primary dissuading factor.111  Hence a closer look at Somalia is 
warranted, since its perceived failure directly weakened the growing 
support for intervention on humanitarian grounds. 
In 1992, the Security Council determined that the internal violence in 
Somalia, which was causing widespread starvation, was a threat to 
international peace and security.112  Pursuant to Chapter VII, it 
authorized an arms embargo and “all the necessary measures to ensure 
the safety of personnel sent to provide humanitarian assistance . . . and 
to ensure full respect for the rules and principles of international law 
regarding the protection of civilian populations.”113  By the end of 1992, 
it had authorized “all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a 
secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia” under 
its Chapter VII authorities.114 
This initial Somalia UN operation, which concluded in spring of 
1993, was largely deemed a success—but one soon undermined by the 
more ambitious Security Council Resolution, which authorized nation-
                                                 
109 See Chaim Kaufmann, See No Evil:  Why America Doesn’t Stop Genocide, FOREIGN AFF. 
(July/Aug. 2002), available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/58061/chaim-
kaufmann/see-no-evil-why-america-doesn-t-stop-genocide?page=2 (reviewing Samantha 
Power’s book discussing the systemic political failures of the United States, which lead to 
reticence regarding humanitarian interventions—claiming that Somalia caused lack of 
intervention in Rwanda is overly simplistic–the Clinton Administration’s domestic political 
calculus and conclusion their existed lack of public support was primary reason for U.S. 
government inaction); see also Power, supra note 24, at 84 (giving statistics about the 
number killed). 
110 Bellamy, supra note 3, at 34. 
111 Kaufmann, supra note 109; see also Chester A. Crocker, The Lessons of Somalia:  Not 
Everything Went Wrong, FOREIGN AFF. (May/June 1995), at 2, available at http://www.pbs. 
org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/readings/lessons.html (“Some see Somalia as 
an almost welcome inoculation against the temptation to intervene in places such as 
Rwanda . . . .”). 
112 S.C. Res. 733, U.N. Doc. S/RES/733 (Jan. 23, 1992). 
113 Id. ¶ 8. 
114  S.C. Res. 794, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (Dec. 3, 1992). 
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building on a grand scale.115  The hand-off between U.S. forces, who had 
been leading the creation of a secure environment for humanitarian relief 
operations per the earlier resolution, and the UN did not go well and 
created conditions ripe for the killing of eighteen U.S. servicemen in 
October 1993.116  These combat deaths shook Americans, and led to the 
withdrawal of U.S. forces from that mission and ultimately to the 
mission’s overall collapse.117  While this failure was due more to strategic 
confusion than to the inappropriateness of humanitarian interventions 
themselves, it led the United States (and others) to seriously question 
armed action on humanitarian grounds for years, and greatly 
contributed to the lack of political will and consensus to become 
involved in stopping the Rwandan genocide.118 
D. Kosovo Debate 
As mentioned above, the Rwandan tragedy and the desire to prevent 
mass atrocities in Kosovo in the late 1990s led world leaders, such as 
Great Britain’s former Prime Minister Tony Blair, to push the 
humanitarian pendulum back toward the pre-Somalia period of 
humanitarian activism.  He declared in 1999 that there existed a right of 
humanitarian intervention when necessary to prevent or stop gross 
human rights abuses within a state, and that this moral right was 
legitimate even without Security Council authorization.119  Then-Prime 
Minister Blair, speaking in Chicago, articulated his theory that armed 
force can be used by a state in three situations:  in self-defense; per a 
Security Council authorization; or in cases of “humanitarian 
intervention.”  He proposed five criteria for use when determining in 
what context such military action outside of the UN was appropriate, 
including whether all diplomatic options had been exhausted and 
whether national interests were at stake.120 
                                                 
115 S.C. Res. 814, U.N. Doc. S/RES/814 (Mar. 26, 1993). 
116 Crocker, supra note 111, at 5. 
117 Id. at 5. 
118  See Walter Clarke & Jeffrey Herbst, Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention, 
FOREIGN AFF. (Mar./Apr. 1996), at 82 (discussing the impact the UN mission in Somalia 
had on future humanitarian crises such as Rwanda, and clarifying Somalia operations). 
119 Abbott & Sloboda, supra note 30; see Blair comments, supra note 107 (“[T]he principle 
of non-interference [in the actions of another sovereign state] must be qualified in 
important respects . . . [because] oppression produces massive flows of refugees which 
unsettle neighbouring countries, then [the underlying acts causing the flight of refugees] 
can properly be described as ‘threats to international peace and security.’”). 
120 Alex J. Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem of Military Intervention, 84 
INT’L AFF. 615, 628 (2008).  [hereinafter Bellamy, Problem of Military Intervention]; see Abbott 
& Sloboda, supra note 30 (describing the ‘Blair doctrine’); see also Blair comments, supra note 
107 (describing Blair’s considerations).  Blair’s five criteria are as follows:  (1) whether the 
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When NATO unilaterally imposed a no-fly zone and militarily 
intervened in Kosovo in 1999 on humanitarian grounds, without host 
nation consent, it did so without approval of the UN Security Council 
because of Chinese and Russian opposition.121  Many at the time, and 
since, have argued that this action was legally ambiguous, or even 
legally appropriate, because of the humans-rights atrocities perpetrated 
by Yugoslav forces in Kosovo and condemned by the Security Council 
itself in specific resolutions.122  Great Britain stated that the use of force 
without Security Council authorization was legitimate “on the grounds 
of overwhelming humanitarian necessity.”123  Germany likewise focused 
on the looming humanitarian disaster and believed that the intervention 
was in-step with the Security Council’s earlier resolutions.124  Belgium 
went even further in arguing that NATO’s unilateral military 
intervention in Kosovo was “lawful” because it was necessary to protect 
a jus cogens, and was consistent with both earlier Security Council 
resolutions and with Article 2(4).125 
As mentioned in the introductory section of this Essay, many legal 
theorists and policy makers have since understood the unilateral NATO 
use of force on humanitarian grounds in Kosovo as having “established 
the norm of resort to force without the authorisation [sic] of the UN 
Security Council.”126  This “norm” theory rested partially on the Security 
Council’s 1999 “retroactive endorsement” of NATO’s action via 
Resolution 1244, which approved the terms of the cease-fire that resulted 
from the NATO action plus authorized NATO troops in Kosovo based 
                                                                                                             
intervenors are sure of the need to intervene (considering that “[w]ar is an imperfect 
instrument for righting humanitarian distress, but armed force is sometimes the only 
means of dealing with dictators”); (2) whether diplomatic options have been exhausted (as 
the international community “should always give peace every chance”); (3) whether 
military operations can be “sensibly and prudently” undertaken; (4) whether the 
intervenors are prepared for a long-term commitment in the state they are intervening in; 
and (5) do the intervenors have national interests involved in the intervention.  Id.     
121 Franck, supra note 77, at 224. 
122 See S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199 (Sept. 23, 1998) (denouncing the human 
rights violations committed by Yugoslav forces in Kosovo); S.C. Res. 1160, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1160 (Mar. 31, 1998) (“Condemning the use of excessive force by Serbian police 
forces against civilians and peaceful demonstrators in Kosovo . . . .”). 
123 Stromseth, supra note 28, at 236 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
124 Id. at 235. 
125 Id. at 236; see Provisional Measures, supra note 31, ¶ II (outlining Belgium’s 
arguments). 
126 Abbott & Sloboda, supra note 30, at 5; see also Bellamy, supra note 3, at 34–35 
(discussing the repercussions of unilateral NATO intervention in Kosovo).  By using the 
term “norm” this Author is not referring to peremptory norms per se.  See generally Rafael 
Nieto-Navia, International Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) and International Humanitarian 
Law (2001), http://www.iccnow.org/documents/WritingColombiaEng.pdf (describing jus 
cogens and norms.). 
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on its Chapter VII authorities.127  Furthermore, a majority of twelve in the 
Security Council defeated Russia’s resolution put forward during the 
intervention in Kosovo, which “demanded an immediate end to the 
intervention” and “condemned NATO’s ‘flagrant violation.’”128 
E. Responsibility to Protect 
No such norm of non-consensual use of force on humanitarian 
grounds, outside the Security Council process, seemed to materialize 
after Kosovo as predicted (and certainly none was implemented to 
prevent the Darfur genocide), though the issue was debated for years.  
The terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001, as well as 
the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, diverted world attention, and the latter 
especially underscored fears that military action on humanitarian 
grounds, especially if without Security Council sanction, was simply 
coercive intervention under cover of the protection of human rights.129  
However, there was progress following Kosovo in establishing a better 
lexicon to describe intervention on humanitarian grounds, as well as 
semi-successful attempts at the UN to agree upon generalized criteria for 
such interventions. 
This lexical progression was in response to a challenge issued in 1999 
by Koffi Annan, then UN Secretary-General, to reconcile the tensions 
between the UN paradigm for authorizing force (specifically its 
prohibition against unilateral action on humanitarian grounds if Security 
Council approval wasn’t given per Chapter VII), and the prevention of 
mass human rights violations within states:   
The inability of the international community in the case 
of Kosovo to reconcile these two equally compelling 
interests—universal legitimacy and effectiveness in 
defence [sic] of human rights—can be viewed only as a 
tragedy.  It has revealed the core challenge to the 
Security Council and to the [UN] as a whole in the next 
century:  to forge unity behind the principle that massive 
                                                 
127 Franck, supra note 77, at 225; see S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244, ¶¶ 1–21 (June 
10, 1999) (noting the necessary action that must take place in order to ensure the safety and 
security of people in Kosovo). 
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and systematic violations of human rights—wherever 
they may take place—should not be allowed to stand.130 
The UN Secretary-General’s challenge supercharged an on-going 
effort to outline definitive criteria as to when humanitarian intervention 
is appropriate.  The Canadian government, via the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (“ICISS”) published 
their response to this challenge in December 2001.131  The resultant 
“responsibility to protect” principle, promulgated shortly after the 
September 11, 2001 attacks, definitively embraced the UN Security 
Council as the appropriate body to “authorize military intervention for 
human protection purposes.”132  It focused on the state as the repository 
of primary responsibility to prevent human suffering within its borders, 
but if the state failed to shoulder this responsibility, this responsibility 
shifted to the international community.133 
The responsibility to protect doctrine’s “human protection purposes” 
focused on a population suffering “serious and irreparable harm” (or 
such harm was “imminently likely”), which involved “large scale loss of 
life . . . [due to] deliberate state action, or state neglect of inability to act, 
or a failed state situation; or large scale ‘ethnic cleansing’ . . . whether 
carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.”134  The 
ICISS document emphasized a requirement to seek Security Council 
authorization prior to any military intervention on humanitarian 
grounds, but also provided options when Security Council authorization 
is not forthcoming:  The General Assembly should consider the matter 
under the “Uniting for Peace” procedure and action by regional 
organizations under Chapter VII of the Charter as long as they seek 
subsequent Security Council authorization.135  The general principle of 
responsibility by the state for protection against suffering within its 
borders, and the principle that it is the international community’s 
responsibility to act in cases in which the state fails to do so, were 
accepted by the international community during the UN World Summit 
in 2005, and unanimously reaffirmed a year later by the Security Council, 
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though without any language referring to the propriety of use of force 
without Security Council authorization.136 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Security Council Resolution 1973 has helped alter the post-Kosovo 
perception “that the requirement of Security Council authorization is an 
obstacle to the protection of basic human rights in internal conflicts.”137  
It may not be emulated soon, due to the presence of critical, case-by-case 
external dynamics (a hated dictator, strong support for intervention by 
regional organizations, etc.), which supported such intervention in 
Libya, but may be lacking in other situations.  Regardless, its passage 
proves that the Security Council can act successfully to authorize 
military action within a sovereign member nation primarily to protect 
civilian populations from crimes against humanity in this post-9/11 era, 
thus implementing the responsibility to protect principles formally 
embraced by the UN in 2005. 
While the Libyan intervention has been criticized, notably by other 
members of the Security Council, for overstepping the resolution’s 
mandate of protecting civilians, it has not been seriously criticized for its 
actual humanitarian intent, nor for stepping outside the bounds of the 
Charter.138  While two veto-holding members of the Security Council, 
China and Russia, did abstain, they were careful to underscore that the 
humanitarian crisis was of “great concern” and both nations emphasized 
their opposition to continuing violence against civilians in Libya.139  In 
fact, shortly after passage of the resolution, Russian President 
Medvedyev stated that he did “not consider the resolution in question 
wrong”—it seems that commercial interests plus fear of instability in the 
Caucasus region prompted the Russian abstention.140  Regarding China, 
this one resolution alone should not be viewed as China jettisoning its 
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traditional non-intervention stance.141  But its opposition appeared based 
on the “blank check,” open-ended nature of the resolution’s “‘all 
necessary measures’” language, versus an abstention based on pure 
sovereignty concerns or objections to the humanitarian intent of the 
UNSCR.142 
The criticism of the Libyan intervention mentioned above centered 
primarily on mission-creep from protection of the civilian population to 
regime change.143  While key NATO leaders were careful to call for the 
Libyan leader to step down instead of claiming it was appropriate to use 
force to do so,144 UN members such as Russia claimed that the 
intervention went beyond its mandate “to use military force to change 
the political system in the country and not just to protect civilians.”145  
This markedly differs from criticism of the resolution’s humanitarian 
objective and grounds, and highlights that UNSCR 1973 reinforced the 
principle that it is the responsibility of the international community to 
protect civilian populations from grave suffering, and that the Security 
Council is the only legal and legitimate means to do so. 
By strengthening the collective international responsibility norm 
articulated in the responsibility to protect doctrine, as well as reinforcing 
the concept that the maintenance of international peace and security can 
include forcible interventions into a sovereign state, UNSCR 1973 
pushed the humanitarian intervention pendulum back toward the 
acceptability of such action.  If such action continues to find greater 
acceptance on the international stage because of an expansion of the 
international legal framework for the legal and legitimate use of force, 
and made easier to conduct via capabilities such as remotely-piloted 
vehicles, greater focus needs to be paid to the jus in bello concerns 
addressed elsewhere in this Essay. 
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